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tive under section 17.42 of the DTPA which forbids waiver of the Act's
provisions.4 7
III.

CONCLUSION

The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Kamarath v. Bennett recognized
that a covenant of habitability is implied by law in residential leases. The
decision rests squarely upon the court's acknowledgment of the realities of
the modem landlord-tenant relationship and the obsolescence of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor, a doctrine which is focused upon the
needs of an agrarian rather than an urban society. Unfortunately, the decision left important questions about the proper measure of damages and
the applicability of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act unanswered. Even more disturbing is the possibility that landlords may use exculpatory clauses to avoid the duty imposed upon them by
the holding, thereby circumventing the public policy considerations upon
which it is based. Should the court subsequently be forced to determine
the effectiveness of a waiver provision, it should consider the ramifications
of its decision with great care. By declaring that waivers in adhesion contracts are void or are in violation of the DTPA, the court can preserve the
protection granted to lessees by the Kamarath opinion. On the other
hand, approval of such waivers would have the effect of restoring the doctrine of caveat emptor to full force in landlord-tenant law.
Clarence Clinton Davis, Jr.

Special Issue Submission in Cases Controlled by the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Spradling v. Williams
N.D. Williams sued Hubert Spradling, a boat dealer, under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DPTA),' alleging
TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon Supp. 1978). Within such a broad definitional framework, a court might rule that the presence of a waiver in an adhesion contract
would take advantage of a lessee to a grossly unfair degree or would result in a gross disparity in consideration. As a result, the landlord might be held liable for treble the tenant's
actual damages plus court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. See id § 17.50.
47. But see Heath, supra note 41, at 10: "The better reasoning is that the implied warranty of habitability can be waived and that if it is effectively waived and disclaimed, then it
never exists and cannot be breached within the meaning of section 17.50 of the act."
A comprehensive discussion of the possible effect of the DTPA on landlord-tenant law is
beyond the scope of this Note. A detailed discussion is contained in Comment, Texas Landlord-Tenant Law and the Deceptive Trade Practices4ct-4ffirmative Remediesfor the Tenant,
8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 807 (1977).

1. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited
and referred to as DTPA or the Act].
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that Spradling had made several misrepresentations about a boat Williams
purchased. The jury found in answer to special issues that Spradling had
made certain representations to Williams, that these representations were
deceptive trade practices, and that Williams had relied on these deceptive
trade practices in purchasing the boat. The trial court accordingly entered
judgment for the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals determined that the
trial court's definition of a deceptive trade practice as one having the capacity to deceive was correct. 2 The Texas Supreme Court granted a writ
of error. Held, affirmed: An act is false, misleading, or deceptive if it has
the capacity or tendency to deceive an average or ordinary person, even
though that person may have been ignorant, unthinking, or credulous.
Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978).
I.

THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT

The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act was
passed in 19733 and has been amended twice since.4 The purpose of the
DTPA is "to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive
business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and
to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection." 5
Because the language of the Act is broad, extensive judicial interpretation
is necessary before the parameters of the DTPA can be clearly defined.
One particular section of the Act that has created confusion requires the
courts to interpret the phrase "false, misleading or deceptive acts ' 6 according to the federal court interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA).7 The federal court decisions in FTCA cases have adopted
2. Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978).
3. For a discussion of the development of the DTPA, see Hill, Introduction to the Consumer Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609 (1977); Maxwell, Public and Private Rights
and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer ProtectionAct, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 617 (1977).
4. Effective September 1, 1975, the legislature broadened the scope of the Act principally by expanding the definition of consumer to include partnerships and corporations, and
the definition of goods to include real estate. See Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The
1975 Amendments to the Consumer ProtectionAct, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1976). Effective
May 23, 1977, the legislature further expanded the scope of the Act and provided three
defenses to treble damages, DTPA § 17.50(A). See Maxwell, Important New Amendments to
the ConsumerProtectionAct, 3 CAVEAT VENDOR 3 (1977); Comment, What Hath the Legislature Wrought? A Critique of the Deceptive Trade PracticesAct as Amended in 1977, 29
BAYLOR

L.

REV.

525 (1977).

5. DTPA § 17.44.
6. A consumer has a cause of action under the DTPA if he has been adversely affected
by (1) a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce (DTPA §§ 17.46(a), 17.50(1)), (2) a breach of an express or implied warranty (DTPA
§ 17.50(2)), (3) an unconscionable action (DTPA § 17.50(3)), or (4) a violation of TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1963) (DTPA § 17.50(a)(4)).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976). As DTPA § 17.46(c)(2) states:
It is the intent of the legislature that in construing Subsection (a) of this section in suits brought under Section 17.50 of this subchapter the courts to the
extent possible will be guided by Subsection (b) of this section and the interpretations given by the federal courts to Section 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act [15 U.S.C.A. 45(a)(1)].
Prior to 1977 the courts were directed to follow the interpretations of both the federal courts
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the "capacity to deceive" test as the definitional standard for a deceptive
trade practice, 8 and prior to Spradling v. Williams some Texas courts already had used this definition in DTPA cases. 9 Several authorities therefore concluded that a finding of actual deception is not necessary in an
action brought under the DTPA,' ° and a plaintiff need not prove that he
believed in or relied on the deceptive trade practice." Although this interpretation may be correct in suits seeking injunctive relief,'2 the Act requires a consumer seeking to recover damages to prove that a deceptive
trade practice occurred and that he was adversely affected by that deceptive trade practice.' 3 Arguably, then, proof of reliance may be required to
establish an adverse effect since the consumer must show some causal link
between his damages and the defendant's unlawful conduct.' 4 Although
the DTPA mandates liberal construction in favor of the consumer, 15 the
abandonment of a reliance requirement could create an unfair burden on
the defendant since he is potentially liable for three times the plaintiffs
actual damages.' 6
and the Federal Trade Commission. The 1977 amendments eliminated the reference to the
FTC interpretations. Cf DTPA § 17.46(c)(1) (in suits initiated by the attorney general's
office the courts are still advised to consider the interpretations of the FTC).
8. See Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th Cir. 1957) ("capacity to deceive and
not actualdeception is the criterion by which practices are tested under the Federal Trade
Commission Act"); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir.
1944).
9. See Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Wesware, Inc. v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ).
10. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 4; Maxwell, supra note 4.
11. Hill, supra note 4, at 613; Maxwell, Damages under the Deceptive Trade PracticesConsumer ProtectionAct, in DAMAGES C-I (Professional Development Program, State Bar
of Texas, September 1977). Maxwell argues that because reliance is inapposite to some of
the proscribed acts, no reliance requirement was intended. Id at C-5 to -6. See also Lynn,
A Remedyfor Undermade and OversoldProducts-The Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct,
7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 698 (1976). Lynn argues that the presence of a scienter requirement in
some of the acts proscribed by § 17.46(b) implies that there is no scienter requirement for the
other proscribed acts.
12. The FTCA was designed to authorize injunctive causes of action by the government
rather than private actions for damages. The earlier DTPA cases using the FTCA standard
also involved injunctions. See cases cited at note 9 supra; Lynn, Anatomy of a Deceptive
Trade Practices Case, 31 Sw. L.J. 867 (1977). Lynn further notes that government suits to
enforce securities laws require less proof of the deceptive nature of the representation than
do private actions for damages. Id at 870 n.24. But see Note, The Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act and Magnuson-Moss: An Explosive Combination, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 559
(1977).
13. DTPA § 17.50(a) states that a "consumer may maintain an action if he has been
adversely affected" by a deceptive trade practice. Compare DTPA § 17.50(a) with id §
17.47, which authorizes public action by the attorney general's office if there is "reason to
believe that any person is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in any act or
practice declared to be unlawful by this subchapter."
14.

See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 108 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 537, Comment a (1976).
15. DTPA § 17.44.
16. Id § 17.50(b)(1) provides that a consumer who prevails may obtain three times the
amount of his actual damages plus court costs and attorneys' fees. In Woods v. Littleton,
554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977), the court ruled that trebling is mandatory. But see DTPA §
17.50A (defenses to treble damages).
Some question exists as to the constitutionality of awarding treble damages for deceptive
trade practices that are not specifically enumerated in id § 17.46(b). See Spradling v. Wil-
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In practice, the courts have employed several approaches in determining
the existence of a deceptive trade practice and in evaluating adverse effect.
Some courts have asked the jury whether there was a deceptive trade practice, 7 and whether the plaintiff was adversely affected.' 8 Other courts
have asked whether the deceptive trade practice was the producing cause
of the plaintiffs damage.' 9 Finally, several courts have submitted a special issue asking whether the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or
deceptive trade practice. 2' These various approaches have resulted because the DTPA does not state the extent to which the FTCA definition of
deceptive is controlling; 2 ' nor does it address the question whether reliance
is necessary to a cause of action under the DTPA.2 2 Against this confused
liams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1978) (Greenhill, C.J., concurring); Singleton v. Pennington, No. 19252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, May 12, 1978, writ filed) (unreported).
17. MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ)
(representations were a deceptive trade practice which adversely affected plaintiffs); Mobile
County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ filed);
Crawford Chevrolet v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ)
(trial court gave specific instructions containing substantially the pertinent language of
DTPA § 17.46; further, the court of civil appeals noted that the record showed evidence of
plaintiff's reliance). See also Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977) (findings on
both reliance and deceptive trade practice).
18. Our Fair Lady Health Resort v. Miller, 564 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1978, no writ); Howze v. Surety Corp. of America, 564 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1978, no writ); MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ); Town and Country Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Stiles, 543 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1976, no writ). See Ceshker v. Bankers Commercial Life Ins. Co., 558 S.W.2d 102
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. See, e.g., Boman v. Woodmansee, 554 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ). Though producing cause is used primarily in products liability cases, at least one
author has suggested its use in DTPA litigation. Maxwell, supra note 11, at C-4. See also
Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977) ("as a result of" defendant's conduct); Woo
v. Great Sw. Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ) (suggests awarding all damages that were "factually caused" by defendant's acts); Yorfino v.
Ferguson, 552 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ) ("resulting from the
deceptive trade practice"); Crawford Chevrolet v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ) ("resulting from deceptive trade practices").
20. Singleton v. Pennington, No. 19252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, May 12, 1978, writ
filed) (unreported); Burnett v. James, 564 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
filed); Cordrey v. Armstrong, 553 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
Whether the courts submitted reliance as a necessary element of a cause of action under the
DTPA is unclear in cases in which the defendant was being tried on alternative bases. See
Littleton v. Woods, 538 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976), affd, 554 S.W.2d
662 (Tex. 1977) (DTPA and common law fraud); Shepherd v. Eagle Lincoln Mercury, Inc.,
536 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ) (DTPA and common law fraud).
21. Compare cases cited in note 9 supra with Singleton v. Pennington, No. 19252 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas, May 12, 1978, writ filed) (unreported) (Aikin, J., dissenting), and Vargus
v. Allied Fin. Co., 545 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. In interpreting the Texas Securities Act, another statute creating a cause of action
for fraudulent practices, the court decided that reliance is not essential to a cause of action
under that Act, reasoning that reliance is not material to some of the practices enumerated
by the statute. See Rio Grande Oil Co. v. State, 539 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1976, no writ) (interpreting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4f (Vernon 1978)).
Contra, reliance has been held to be a required element in the implied private right of action
for deceptive security trading practices, despite the absence of any codified reliance requirement. See Simon v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884-85 (5th
Cir. 1973); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
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background, the Texas Supreme Court decided Spradling v. Williams. 23
II.

SPRADLING V. WILLIAMS

The Spradling v. Williams decision is important because the court established the proper definition of deceptive trade practice. Furthermore, although the court did not specifically address the reliance issue, some
portions of the opinion imply that in a DTPA action a plaintiff must prove
reliance. The trial court in Spradling submitted special issues to the jury
in groups of three. The first special issue in each group asked whether a
specific act or misrepresentation occurred; the second special issue asked
whether such act or misrepresentation was a deceptive trade practice as
defined by the court; and the third special issue asked whether the plaintiff
relied on the deceptive trade practice.24 On appeal the only issues
presented concerned the trial court's instructions to the jury.25 The defendant argued that the trial court's definition of the term "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" as an "act or series of acts which has the
capacity to deceive an average or ordinary person, even though that person
may have been ignorant, unthinking or credulous"2 6 was prejudicial since
the definition improperly reduced the plaintiffs burden of proof.27 The
court of appeals, however, ruled that this definition was proper,28 and the
supreme court affirmed.2 9
In explaining its decision, the supreme court noted that because the
cause of action is statutorily created, the courts must follow the legisla23. In Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977), its only previous interpretation
of the DTPA, the court ruled that trebling of damages is mandatory, and that a cause of
action accrues at the time of the misrepresentation rather than at the time of sale. See
generally Note, Automatic Treble Damages'underthe Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer ProtectionAct, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 595 (1977).
24. 566 S.W.2d at 562.
25. The modem trend in appellate review allows the trial court considerable discretion
in deciding what instructions are necessary and proper. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; Mobil
Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974); cf.Bragg, supranote 4, at 14 (suggesting that
courts should be tolerant of detailed instructions to insure that the jury fully understands the
rules which govern the answers to whether a defendant's conduct is false, misleading, or
deceptive).
26. 566 S.W.2d at 562.
27. The defendant also argued that the trial court had erred by giving the jury a list of
five specific misrepresentations that Spradling had allegedly made, and instructing the
jury that if such representations had been made, they were deceptive trade practices. Both
the court of civil appeals and the supreme court held this part of the charge erroneous, but
found that Spradling had not been prejudiced. The supreme court noted that other jury
findings showed conclusively that Spradling had committed at least one of the deceptive
trade practices specifically proscribed in DTPA § 17.46(b); thus, the error was harmless.
566 S.W.2d at 563-64. The court of civil appeals reasoned that the defendant was not
prejudiced since the acts listed for the jury were in fact deceptive trade practices; the court
also noted that DTPA § 17.44 requires a liberal construction of the Act. 553 S.W.2d at 146.
According to Justice Keith's dissent, which was cited by Justice Steakley in his dissenting
opinion, 566 S.W.2d at 565, the erroneous charge was harmful since it was an improper
comment on the weight of the evidence and informed the jury of the effect of their answers.
553 S.W.2d at 147-48.
28. Justice Keith dissented on this point also. 553 S.W.2d at 149.
29. 566 S.W.2d at 562-63.
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ture's directive 31 to use the federal courts' FTCA decisions as a guide in
construing the DTPA. 3' The supreme court thus determined that the trial
32
court's definition of a "false, misleading or deceptive act" was correct,
noting that the trial court had properly adopted the definition used in
FTCA decisions. 33 This holding is significant not only because it is the
first supreme court ruling on this key issue, but also because the court applied the FTCA definition of deceptive trade practice, which is used primarily in injunctive actions,34 to a private action for damages.
The supreme court also clarified the importance of section 17.46(b) of
the statute, the "laundry list," in which twenty-two examples of "false,
misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" are enumerated. 35 According
to the court, the jury should not be asked whether the defendant's action
was deceptive if the action corresponds to one of the listed deceptive trade
practices.3 6 If any of the listed acts is found to have occurred, that act is
by law an unlawful deceptive trade practice.37
According to some authorities, if an act is by law a deceptive trade prac38
tice, a plaintiff need not prove that he relied on the misrepresentation.
This interpretation, however, is not entirely supported by the court's opinion. 39 The court limited its decision to the trial court's instructions to the
jury, and did not specifically consider the issue of reliance. The court's
opinion, however, seems to imply that a showing of reliance is a prerequisite to consumer recovery under the DTPA. The supreme court concluded that Spradling's representation that the boat sold to Williams was a
1973 model, when in fact the boat was an older model, was a deceptive
If mere existence of a deceptive trade practice were a
trade practice.'
30. DTPA § 17.46(c)(2).

31. 566 S.W.2d at 562. The court referred to its previous analysis in State v. Credit
Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1975), in which the court dealt with an earlier
deceptive trade practices act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-10.02(b) (Vernon 1971)
(current version at DTPA § 17.46). In that decision the court looked to federal precedent to
see if the federal courts had approved the interpretation used.
32. 566 S.W.2d at 564.
33. See note 8 supraand accompanying text for a discussion of judicial interpretation of
the FTCA.

The Massachusetts consumer protection statute, like Texas' DTPA, points to FTCA interpretations as a guide in construing unfair or deceptive acts. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, §
2(b) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975). The Massachusetts court has accordingly decided that
proof of reliance is not necessary in a cause of action under their consumer protection act.
Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975).

34. See notes 9 & 12 supra.
35. See generaly Maxwell, supra note 3, at 625.
36. According to one commentator, the question of what is "false, deceptive or misleading" requires application of a legal standard and, therefore, is never a question for the jury.

Bragg, supra note 4, at 12.
37. 566 S.W.2d at 563.
38. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. This interpretation is particularly appealing since reliance is inapposite to some of the laundry list activities. See, e.g., DTPA §
17.46(b)(21) (proscribes filing suit against a consumer in a county other than the one in

which the defendant resides or in which he signed the contract on which the suit is based).
39. See also notes 13 & 14 supra and accompanying text.
40. 566 S.W.2d at 563-64. The court noted that jury finding number thirteen corre-

sponds to DTPA § 17.46(b)(7): "representing that goods or services are of a particular stan-
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sufficient basis for recovery under the Act, the judgment of the lower court
could have been approved without further analysis. The supreme court,
however, also discussed Spradling's defense that the year model was immaterial because an ordinary consumer would not consider the year model
in purchasing a secondhand boat. 4 ' The court's consideration of this defense indicates that the consumer's reliance on the misrepresentation may
be an element of a deceptive trade practice action.4 2 Moreover, Justice
Greenhill's concurring opinion, which questions the constitutionality of allowing treble damages for activities not specifically proscribed in section
17.46(b), assumes that reliance is integrally related to recovery of damages
under the DTPA:
It is one thing for the Legislature to create a cause of action in tort or
contract for actual damages caused by reliance on unfair and deceptive
tradepractices;but it is another thing for it to create a penalty of triple
damages for the violation of unwritten, unlisted and unspecified unlawful acts.43
Unfortunately, since the court never directly addressed the reliance issue,
the opinion is subject to conflicting interpretations.
III.

CONCLUSION

In Spradling v. Williams the Texas Supreme Court explained the proper
means of submitting special issues to determine the existence of a deceptive trade practice under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act. If a defendant's action corresponds to one of the activities
included in the "laundry list" of proscribed actions, the jury should not be
asked whether the defendant's action or representation was false, misleading, or deceptive. In such cases the act is deceptive by law, and a jury
finding that the act occurred is sufficient to establish a deceptive trade
practice. If a defendant's action is not one specifically enumerated in the
Act, the jury must find that the activity occurred and that it was deceptive;
that is, that it had the tendency or capacity to deceive an average or ordinary person, even though that person may have been ignorant, unthinking,
or credulous. Proof of a deceptive trade practice, however, is not sufficient
for recovery under the DTPA; the consumer must also prove that he has
been adversely affected. Although the supreme court may later decide
that reliance on the deceptive trade practice is required to establish adverse
effect, the Spradling court refrained from addressing the issue of reliance.
The court's decision implies, however, that a special issue submission on
reliance is appropriate. Undoubtedly, the court will be forced to clarify
dard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of
another."
41. 566 S.W.2d at 564. That the court dealt with this issue is particularly significant in
that it was not one of the points brought forth on appeal.
42. Id The only conclusion the court actually states is that the evidence showed that a
1972 model boat was worth less than a 1973 model. The court, therefore, may have believed that Williams was adversely affected regardless of whether he believed or relied on
Spradling's statement because the boat he purchased was worth less than a 1973 model.
43. 566 S.W.2d at 565 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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the elements necessary for recovery under the DTPA in subsequent judicial interpretations.
Cindy Morgan Ohlenforst
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